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EVIDENTIARY ASPECTS OF RELEVANT PRODUCT
MARKET PROOF IN MONOPOLIZATION CASES
By Orrin K. Ames III*
Professor Ames offers a useful survey of the evidentiary as-
pects of relevant product market proof in monopolization cases.
He first examines those factors which may be used to determine
which items or services compete or might compete with prod-
ucts or services supplied by the defendant. He then suggests
various evidentiary techniques for establishing the parameters
of the relevant market.
An antitrust case, of course, does not possess the dra-
matic interest of a murder mystery, but it does share, with
other trials, the excitements of clashing strategies and tac-
tics and the crossing of swords by worthy antagonists im-
bued with a fierce will to win.'
Milton Handler
I. INTRODUCTION
When deciding whether a defendant corporation has violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act, courts determine whether there is or
could be competition in the defendant's relevant product market.
Obviously, the defendant wants and needs to demonstrate to the
court that the relevant product market is broad and that there is
competition rather than monopolization by the defendant. This
Article first sets forth various factors used to define the relevant
market and then analyzes several types of evidence with reference
to the way they are used by the courts and how they can be
applied in relevant product market inquiries.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law; B.S., Univer-
sity of Alabama, 1966; J.D. cum laude, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University,
1969; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1975.
1. Handler, Introduction: Symposium, 18 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 13 (1961).
2. The focus of this work is on evidentiary aspects in the context of a trial in a court of
law and not before administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission. Cer-
tain cases examined will be those decided at the court of appeals level because courts at
this level review Federal Trade Commission decisions. The focus will be on how the courts
view evidence under this review procedure.
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The analysis will be within the framework of monopolization as
prohibited by Section 2 of the Sherman Act3 in which courts
specifically use the term relevant product market. Because the
same analytical process takes place in merger cases under Section
7 of the Clayton Act,4 both monopolization and merger cases will
be cited to illustrate evidentiary examples and analytical pro-
cesses. It is necessary to point out that the courts in merger cases
frequently use the term relevant product market interchangeably
with the term line of commerce.
II. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET
Interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 the Supreme Court
in United States v. Grinnell Corp.' stated:
The offense of monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.7
Monopolization, therefore, requires the possession of monopoly
power in an economic sense plus the element of deliberateness.
Courts have defined monopoly power as "the power to control
3. 15 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. V 1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. IV 1975).
Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. V 1975). Prior to the 1974 amendment the offense was a misdemeanor
and less severe penalties were available. These changes are not of importance in the
present discussion.
Section 2 establishes three offenses: monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
combinations or conpiracies to monopolize. It can be violated by one or more persons or
businesses. This work will be primarily concerned with the first offense of monopolization.
6. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
7. Id. at 570-71.
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prices or exclude competition."'i The question raised is not neces-
sarily whether prices actually have been raised and competition
actually excluded, but rather whether there is the power to do so
when desired.? The litigation of a monopolization case turns on
an analysis of the entity's structure, power, and actions, and the
effect of those factors within a competitive environment.' 0
Whether one prefers to view and test monopolization by its
abuse within the area of competition, by its structure, by its
performance, or by its conduct," a threshold issue is that of rele-
vant market. Before it can be determined whether monopoly
power exists in an economic sense, it is necessary to define the
relevant market in which the supposed power over prices or com-
petition is to be tested. There are various indicators of competi-
tion'" and once the market in which competition does, or might
take place is defined, these indicators of competition can be ap-
plied. In defining the relevant market, the courts look to the
relevant product market as well as the relevant geographic mar-
ket. Both combined constitute the relevant market in which the
businessman must operate and in which an alleged monopolist's
power will be tested.
The term relevant product market describes those items or
services which compete or might compete with the products or
services supplied by the defendant. The inquiry focuses on actual
8. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
9. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
10. There are no precise definitions of competition and monopoly. Neither
economics nor law has produced a uniform classification of competitive and
monopolistic situations. True, there are well-accepted concepts of the two condi-
tions in their pure forms. However, neither of these fits the world in being.
M. MAssEL, COMPETTION AND MONOPOLY 186-87 (1962) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as MASSEL].
11. For an excellent comparison of the "abuse" and "structure" theories and their
applicability in determining whether an illegal monopoly exists, see G. HALE & R. HALE,
MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN AcT (1958) [hereinafter cited as
HALE]. For a discussion of conduct versus structure approaches to antitrust litigation as
well as a good example of economic testimony involving such issues, see Scanlon,
Economics in the Courtroom: The "Technology" of Antitrust Litigation, 3 ANTrIrRUST L.
& EcoN. Rxv. 43 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Scanlon]. For an argument favoring consid-
erable use of economic theory by the legal profession and a shift from conduct offenses to
an analysis of performance, see Marx, Economic Theory and Judicial Process: A Case
Study, 20 ANTTRuST BuLL. 775 (1975).
12. MASSEL, supra note 10, at 186-235.
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competition and what products are, or will be, substitutable with
the product in question. This does not encompass the infinite
range of possible substitutes, but only those reasonably inter-
changeable. 3 In analyzing the relevant product market, there are
key areas of inquiry which should be considered in every case.
They are economic in nature and serve to provide a framework
for determining the dimensions of the relevant product market.
A. Customer Factors'4
1. Physical Characteristics
One factor used to determine whether a product should stand
alone in a market or be joined with other products is its physical
similarity to other products. However, even when courts have
noted physical similarities or dissimilarities, relevant product
market determinations most often are made on the basis of one
or more other factors. This is because the basic focus is on substi-
tutability. Even products that are not physically identical some-
times may be substituted by consumers. 5
A recent case in which inherent similarities were recognized
was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club."5 The court had to determine whether to include
major league professional hockey, minor league professional
hockey, and amateur hockey in the relevant product market or
whether to restrict the market to major league professional
hockey."
The court recognized identities, saying:
13. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
14. The discussion that follows is not meant to be all-inclusive. There may very well
be other key areas that counsel will have to examine. These will, however, serve as a
framework for this Article and enable analysis of some evidentiary aspects involved in the
litigation of these areas of inquiry. For a discussion of these, see MASSEL, supra note 10,
at 240, in which the author lists other indicators such as stages of marketing, integration,
and manufacture. These additional indicators are not generally concentrated on by the
courts in product market analysis and will not be discussed in this Article. For further
discussions of these indicators, see 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS/
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS §8.02(2)(a) (1976); 16B id. § 18.03(2).
15. See United States v. E. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1956).
16. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
17. Id. at 501.
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Any hockey match whether in the NHL, the minor professional
hockey leagues, or in the amateur leagues always includes one
hockey rink, 12 hockey players, two referees, and a similar set
of rules before a greater or lesser number of spectators."'
In spite of this similarity, the court held that the relevant prod-
uct market included only major league professional hockey be-
cause of factors such as "higher ticket prices, increased television
revenues, and greater players' skill and salaries" and "discretion
in the fans to refrain from paying higher prices for low perform-
ance."19
Physical characteristics, however, may be so unique as to en-
able a court to consider a particular product in a separate rele-
vant market. In United States v. M.P.M., Inc. 0 the court held
that ready-mix concrete occupied a relevant product market
distinct from other building materials. The court cited key
physical properties of ready-mix such as the fact that it, unlike
other construction materials, could be used to conform to practi-
cally any shape within design limitations and that it had tre-
mendous strength, durability, and fire resistance. The court also
drew on testimony from various building contractors that for
certain purposes ready-mix was used exclusively.'
2. End Use of Products
In examining end uses, the courts will look for those products
which are used by consumers for the same purpose and are rea-
sonably interchangeable. Although the aspect of end use is closely
related to physical properties, a product may be used differently
by varying groups of consumers. The market determination,
therefore, may not be based on the product's physical properties
alone. Furthermore, consumers may employ physically dissimilar
items toward essentially the same end use, thus necessitating
18. Id.
19. Id. For a similar treatment of the issue, see International Boxing Club v. United
States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
20. 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975).
21. Id. at 87. See also United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 544-46 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975), in which the court cited unique construction and appearance features in
holding industrial rental garments to be a line of commerce.
[Vol. 26:530
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that these products be included in the same relevant product
market.
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.2" serves as an
excellent example of the latter situation. DuPont involved prod-
ucts which were chemically and somewhat physically dissimilar,
such as different types of cellophane, glassine, and wax paper. In
presenting its case, duPont concentrated on the end uses of prod-
ucts. In so doing, duPont was able to show that in spite of physi-
cal dissimilarities, its product, cellophane, competed with var-
ious other forms of wrapping material for the end use of packag-
ing.
There also may be certain products that are unique for certain
purposes, thus tending to show that they are in a separate mar-
ket.2" In the recent case of SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 4
the district court narrowed the relevant product market by hold-
ing that it was not made up of all antibiotic drugs as the defen-
dant contended, but rather that it was limited to the nonprofit
hospital market for cephalosporin drugs. This conclusion was
based partly upon findings that the cephalosporin family of
antibiotic drugs displayed "noticeable and acknowledged differ-
ences in the relative effectiveness" when compared with other
antibiotics in treating certain illnesses. 5
A court's finding that a product is unique also can serve as a
basis for excluding it from a relevant product market. Such a
situation occurred in Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC"5 in which the
court excluded aerosol spray paints from the paint brush and
roller market because aerosols were used for specialized painting
for which a roller or brush would be impractical. The end use
determination, therefore, was not directed at which products to
include in the market, but at which products to exclude.
22. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
23. See Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 1972) (portland
cement); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975) (ready-mix
concrete); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 544-46 (M.D. Tenn. 1975)
(industrial rental garments); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 348 F. Supp. 606,
617-18 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (car air-conditioning units for Volkswagen products).
24. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,199 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1977).
25. Id.
26. 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976).
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3. Attractiveness to Buyers
Certain products simply may have more customer appeal. This
may or may not be related to physical characteristics. The court
in Philadelphia World Hockey Club,27 in holding that major
league professional hockey was a separate market, relied in part
on a finding that major league hockey games are generally sold
out whereas minor league games draw only a fraction of arena
seating capacity."'
4. Cross-Elasticity of Demand
Within the aspect of product substitutability, elasticity of
demand and cross-elasticity of demand are pivotal concepts.
Elasticity of demand reflects the change in the quantity of a
product demanded compared with its change in price.29 Because
the relevant product market analysis concerns which products or
services exert competitive pressures on the product or services in
question, the inquiry focuses on the relationship between price
and quantity of the defendant's product and the prices and
quantities of other possible substitutes. Economists define this
relationship as cross-elasticity of demand. °
For example, Company A might increase its price on a product,
causing a decrease of sales of that product. If, as a result of the
price increase, Company B sells more of a similar product, then
Company B's product may be considered to be in the same mar-
ket as Company A's product because consumers seem to regard
the products as substitutable.
27. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
28. The court stated that:
The popularity of major league professional hockey vis-a-vis its minor league
counterpart is indicated by the fact that average 1969-70 season attendance in
the NHL East Division was more than 100% of rated seating capacity. ...
Chicago Blackhawks President William Wirtz testified that his team's games
are typically sold out, but that in contrast the Blackhawks' Dallas minor league
team draws only 2,500 in an 8,000 seat arena.
Id. at 471. See also Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 268 F.2d 13, 15 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 831 (1959) (court sustained district court's finding that
performance rights in gospel music constituted separate product market because the
music was distinct and without substitute).
29. For a discussion of elasticity of demand and the formula for it, see P. ASCH, Eco-
NOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 139-41 (1970).
30. Id. at 141.
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The major problem in determining relevant product market is
how to measure and show cross-elasticities and at what coeffi-
cient to say meaningful cross-elasticity exists.3' Where products
do exhibit some price/demand responsiveness, they are more
likely to be included in the same market.32 If the products do not
respond to each other by virtue of price changes, this is evidence
that they are in separate product markets.33
5. Relative Prices
Where products are thought to be substitutes, but are very
different in price, their price difference may place the products
in separate markets. For example, unique price was one key fac-
tor in the district court's determination in Philadelphia World
Hockey34 that major league professional hockey was a separate
31. Id. See MASSEL, supra note 10, at 245; HALE, supra note 11, at 109. The formula used
to measure cross-elasticity is really a way of expressing, numerically, the substitutability
of products by consumers in relation to prices for those products. The higher the numerical
coefficient, the greater the substitutability. Consumer response is the key to the measure-
ment.
32. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) in which the Supreme Court
recognized cross-elasticity of demand. In Brown the Court also recognized the fact that,
as in merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, there may be well-defined submar-
kets within broader markets, which can themselves be analyzed as product markets. See
also American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir.
1958) in which beet sugar and cane sugar were held to be in the same market because of
evidence of price changes in one producing equivalent and corresponding changes in the
other. The court recognized that sensitivity to price changes and not price differentials
was the key to cross-elasticity of demand.
33. In United States v. ALCOA, 377 U.S. 271, 275-77 (1964), aluminum conductors and
copper conductors were considered separate lines of commerce under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act because of a lack of price response to one another. The court in General Foods
Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1967), in affirming and enforcing an FTC divesti-
ture order, noted that the FTC had failed to introduce evidence on consumer sensitivity
to price changes between steel and non-steel wool soap pads, but that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the prices between the two displayed no sensitivity.
This evidence was in the form of oral testimony from company executives regarding
pricing policies. In United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324, 330
(E.D. La. 1968), the court held that crew boats were in a separate market from supply or
utility boats because of distinct uses and because their relative different costs showed the
lack of sensitivity to price. See also SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 61,199 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1977).
34. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The average ticket price for the National Hockey
League was $5.22, for the American Hockey League it was $3.07, for the World Hockey
League it was $2.47, and for the Canadian Hockey League it was $2.42. Id. at 471. See
1977]
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market from minor league professional hockey and amateur
league hockey. The court found that there was a much higher
average ticket price for major league professional hockey than for
the other two.
There also can be a separate market determination based on a
low price advantage enjoyed by a product. 5 Price alone, however,
will not always be a determining factor and even where there are
price differences, the courts may find that the products still com-
pete and should be included in the market."
also International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), in which the Su-
preme Court, in determining that the relevant product market was the promotion of
championship boxing as compared to all professional boxing events, cited the following
monetary differences:
[T]he average revenue from all sources for appellants' championship bouts was
$154,000, compared to $40,000 for their nonchampionship programs; . . .
television rights to one championship fight brought $100,000, in contrast to
$45,000 for a nontitle fight seven months later [and] spectators pay
"substantially more" for tickets to championship fights than for nontitle fights.
Id. at 250-51. See also United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 973 (W.D. Pa.
1965), in which the court found Penn Grade crude oil to be in a relevant product submar-
ket because for one reason, it commanded distinct prices; Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d
928, 931-32 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970) in which the court upheld
the FTC's determination that sintered metal friction materials were in a relevant submar-
ket from organic friction materials, one reason being the former's higher prices; Elco Corp.
v. Microdot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 749 (D. Del. 1973) in which metal plate connectors
which enjoyed a premium price were determined to be in a separate market.
35. In United States v. ALCOA, 377 U.S. 271 (1964), the Supreme Court gave great
weight to the fact that insulated aluminum conductors were priced considerably below
insulated copper conductors in determining that the former was in a separate submarket.
The Court considered that "the single, most important practical factor in the business."
Id. at 276. The court in General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968), upheld the Commission's determination that household steel
wool products were in a market separate from other non-steel wool household aids. One
reason was evidence showing that household steel wool products sold at distinctly lower
prices. Id. at 942. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court,
in an FTC divestiture action, upheld the Commission's determination that the production
and sale of decorative aluminum foil to the florist trade was the relevant line of commerce.
One key basis for this was the pricing. The foil sold to florists was considerably lower in
price than foil sold to other markets. The court noted the illogic of assuming that a
prudent businessman would buy a similar product at a higher price. Absence of such a
practice among businessmen, the court held, permits the inference that florist foil is
different from other types. Id. at 239.
36. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), one of
the best examples, in which, despite price differentials, other flexible packaging materials
were included in the relevant product market with cellophane.
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6. Public Recognition of the Product
When evidence shows that the public distinguishes products in
groups or categories, this may be evidence of product markets or
submarkets. The district court in United States v. Brown Shoe
Co."7 acknowledged the public's tastes in shoes by noting that the
male and female population wear distinctly different types of
shoes.3" The Supreme Court eventually upheld the district court's
reliance on this public recognition as one reason for considering




If a product, because of some unique quality, can be utilized
only by a defined, distinct customer, this will be an indication
that the product might be in a separate market or submarket. For
example, foil used by florists has been found to be distinct from
other kinds of foil'" and Pennsylvania crude oil has been found to
have a market separate from other crude oils."
B. Manufacturing Factors
1. Influence of Sellers' Costs
Although this issue may very well go to the question of monop-
oly power rather than the determination of the market, Judge
Hand's reasoning in the case of United States v. Corn Products
Refining Co. 2 would exclude products from a relevant market if
37. 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
38. Id. at 731.
39. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962). The court in United
States v. ALCOA, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965),
also specifically cited customer recognition of metal curtain walls as distinct from pre-cast
or any other type of curtain wall. The court found that when a specific type of metal wall
was called for, such as aluminum, sub-bids would be accepted on alternative metals but
not on non-metals. Id. at 725.
40. Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41. United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 974-75 (W.D. Pa. 1965). But see
Seeburg Corp. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 124, 129 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970)
in which the court held against Seeburg Corp.'s definition of the relevant market because
it only took into consideration the single factor of distinct customers.
42. 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1918).
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the production costs of some producers were well above the al-
leged monopolist's costs.4" This is because if the alleged monopo-
list has a very low cost of production, he has the ability, at will,
to reduce his price to a level at which cross-elasticity may disap-
pear. In that event, the other products may no longer be realisti-
cally considered in the product market. This rationale, however,
has not been widely applied in relevant product market analyses.
2. Methods of Production (Unique Production Facilities)
The use of special machinery in producing a product may be
one indication that the product so produced should be in a sepa-
rate market. The Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States44
clearly recognized this as a criteria for a market determination by
listing it in its designation of the boundaries of submarkets. 4"
While courts may cite unique production facilities as one indica-
tor of the relevant product market,"4 they also may cite the ab-
sence of such uniqueness as an indicator that the market should
not be so restricted . 7 In this area of inquiry, production facilities,
43. MASSEL, supra note 10, at 245-46.
44. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
45. Id. at 325. This was a Section 7, Clayton Act case. The Court in its opinion provided
a checklist of indicators in such merger cases. This checklist also can be applied to a
Section 2, Sherman Act, relevant product market determination because courts recognize
that the tests for relevant product markets under both statutory sections may be the same.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966).
46. See Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 1970) (court cited testimony
before the FTC's hearing examiner concerning "the differences in methodology and plant
equipment required to produce them" as one reason for upholding the FTC's determina-
tion that sintered metal friction materials were in a relevant submarket from all friction
materials); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967) (court recognized
unique production facilities for producing household steel wool products); United States
v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975) (court found ready-mix concrete to
be the line of commerce, stating as one reason: "Production facilities of ready-mix con-
crete may be utilized for the production of ready-mix concrete and for no other purpose");
United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (court specifi-
cally considered special machinery designed for the purpose of converting pulp and basic
tissue stock into sanitary paper products, such as facial tissue and toilet tissue, as unique
production facilities and found that sanitary paper products were a distinct product
submarket within the coarse paper and paper products submarkets); United States v.
ALCOA, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), a/f'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965) (court
cited unique and specialized production facilities as one reason for determining that
aluminum curtain wall was a line of commerce within outer markets of curtain wall and
metal curtain wall).
47. See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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methods, and technology all may be considered.
Although courts consider the uniqueness of production facili-
ties as an indicator of the relevant product market, some econo-
mists are skeptical whether unique production facilities necessar-
ily represent the true competitive environment of a product. It is
their belief that consumers, by and large, will decide what they
want without regard to whether it was produced at a plant with
unique production facilities. As long as consumers can, or will,
substitute products, there may be competitive pressure regardless
of the nature of the plant or the production facilities."8
3. Cross-Elasticity of Production Facilities
This is another area in which the focus is not on the consumer
and his choices regarding substitutability. The focus is on other
manufacturers or potential manufacturers who can change to the
production of the product in question if it becomes economically
profitable to do so. 9 Their entry into a market is a function of
price. The concept of cross-elasticity of production facilities is
tied to the notion that courts should be concerned with those
products or the potential supply of those products which put
decision making pressure on the producers of the product under
examination.
The viability of this criteria for relevant product market deter-
minations is unsettled. 0 Although courts have rejected argu-
ments for expanding the markets in merger cases based on this
rationale," they have narrowed markets by focusing on unique
production facilities.52 In spite of the uncertainty regarding the
48. See HALE, supra note 11, at 105-13.
49. The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)
said: "The cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in
defining a product market within which a vertical merger is to be viewed."
50. ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 47 (1975).
51. See United States v. ALCOA, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,
296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Pennzoil
Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965). In Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 348
F. Supp. 606, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the district judge expressly rejected the concept in a
merger case, stressing that competition must be measured by the product and its relation
in the marketplace.
52. See Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1970); General Foods Corp. v. FTC,
386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439
(N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. ALCOA, 233 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Mo. 1964); United
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use of this factor as an indicator, many economists feel that at-
tention must be given to cross-elasticity of production facilities
when determining the relevant product market.53
There is recent indication that the courts are now seriously
analyzing this factor. In Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp.54 and Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida
Plant Corp. ," the courts paid considerable attention to the degree
of difficulty encountered by potential competitors in adjusting
their production methods in order to compete with the
defendants' products. Both decisions resulted in findings that the
costs were not prohibitive, thus expanding the relevant product
markets and defeating the plaintiffs' contentions of monopoliza-
tion.
4. Entry Barriers
Closely related to both methods of production and cross-
elasticity of production facilities is the issue of entry barriers.
Although economic and financial conditions which pose obstacles
to the entry of another competitor generally have been examined
in the context of whether a firm possesses monopoly power, or
what the effect will be on competition in merger cases, the court
in United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.5" dealt with this situa-
States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 381
U.S. 414 (1965).
53. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 63-64; Economics in the Courtroom: A "Structural"
Defense in a Monopoly Case, 1 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 45, 52-53 (1968). See also
Edwards, Use and Abuse of Economics in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
38 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Edwards] in which Corwin D. Edwards, Professor of
Government and Business, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago stated:
Economists worth their salt also realize that, on the supply side of the market,
there is cross-elasticity of supply, that under appropriate incentives the seller
may be capable of substituting alternative goods for his present goods, and that
the substitutability of goods in the productive process also helps determine the
boundary of the market.
Id. at 44.
With reference to productive capacity and entry barriers, it has been argued that "ease
of entry factors at least indirectly shape the concept of relevant market, although not
entering into its final determination." Schlade, Proposed Objective Relevant Product
Market Criteria Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
35 U. CiN. L. REv. 376, 384 (1966). See also MASSEL, supra note 10, at 250; note 56 infra.
54. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
55. 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1108 (1977).
56. ANTrrUST & TRADE REG. RPe. (BNA), No. 794, at A-1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1976).
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tion in the context of a relevant product market-type analysis in
an acquisition situation.
5. Specialized Vendors
Where products are marketed through separate and specialized
systems of vendors, that fact has been recognized as one indica-
tion that the products may be in separate markets." The absence
of specialized vendors, however, does not necessarily show that
the products are in the same market or submarkets. 5
6. Industry Recognition of the Product
Recognition of separate markets by the firms in question or the
industry itself has been given considerable weight by the courts.
Frequently, the very company involved will have documentation
or other internal indicia that it considers its product a separate
competitive entity. 9 It also may have its marketing structure set
up in such a way as to indicate separate entities. 0
Indications of the way the industry views the products also may
provide evidence as to a relevant product market. Such an indica-
tion was found in General Foods Corp. v. FTC,"' in which the
57. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v.
Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 546 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (district court cited separate sales
forces and unique knowledge required of the sales personnel for industrial rental garments
to rental laundries); United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); United States v. ALCOA, 233 F. Supp. 718, 725 (E.D. Mo. 1964). See also United
States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975) (court held ready-mix concrete a
separate line of commerce and focused on the unique method of distribution).
58. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir. 1967) (FTC failed to
make findings on the issue of specialized vendors and yet found separate markets for
household steel wool products as compared to non-steel wool products). The circuit court
upheld the FTC, indicating that not all criteria as listed in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), need to be present to make a determination.
59. See Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 930-31 (6th Cir. 1970) (specifically referring
to the company's annual reports); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir.
1967) (cited the defendant's recognition that certain competition was indirect); Reynolds
Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (intracompany communications
reflected the "specialty nature" of the florist foil converting industry); United States v.
Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 972 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (cited the petition filed with the
Public Utilities Commission of West Virginia by the president of Pennzoil).
60. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States
v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
395 F. Supp. 538, 546 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
61. 386 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir. 1967).
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pricing decisions of several manufacturers of household steel wool
products indicated that the manufacturers considered their only
serious competition to be from other steel wool products. Other
types of industry recognition have been: decisions not to serve a
particular market,62 categorizing products though the use of ter-
minology, sales patterns, catalogues,63 trade association data,6'
accounting structures," and assignment of standard industrial
classification codes."6
III. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing indicators of relevant product market are merely
guideposts that the courts use in determining the effective area
of competition for products or services. Before the courts can
utilize them, counsel must employ evidentiary techniques to
place various types of evidence before the court. Because of the
diverse nature of the relevant product market indicators, the
types of evidence will range from those which are highly techni-
cal, such as samples and polls, to those which are relatively sim-
ple, such as testimony from salespersons. The persuasive impact
of the various types does not necessarily correspond with their
degree of complexity. This section will examine the use and per-
suasiveness of various kinds of evidence. 7
62. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
63. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 452-54 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
64. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975). See also Elco
Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 749 (D. Del. 1973).
65. United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975).
67. Problems of admissibility of various forms of evidence will not be stressed. They
will be referenced but they are not the focal point of this work. The purpose of this work
is to examine how the courts use the various forms of evidence admitted before them in
their decision-making processes.
Another key area which will not be treated in this Article is the use of judicial notice.
It is unquestionably an important factor in antitrust litigation as well as any other litiga-
tion. Its utility ranges over many other areas of specific evidence which will be discussed
herein. For a good summary of the use of judicial notice, see Dession, The Trial of
Economic and Technological Issues of Fact: II, 58 YALE L.J. 1242, 1248-50 (1949) [here-
inafter cited as Dession]; 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONs/ANTI-
TRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATION §110.02, at 110-31 to 110-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
VON KALINOWSKI]. Section 2.60(h) of the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION (rev. ed. 1975)
sanctions the use of judicial notice for standard publications, stating:
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A. Visual Techniques
1. Views by the Court
Issues which are capable of being understood and appreciated
more by direct observation lend themselves to the use of a view
by the trial court.18 Such issues may involve the nature of unique
production facilities or cross-elasticity of production facilities, in
which counsel are trying to show the ease or difficulty of other
manufacturers duplicating the necessary production capabilities.
Issues involving the nature of the product and the nature of com-
petition also may be illuminated by the use of a view. Views have
been used and cited as being important in at least two major
antitrust cases: United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.6"
and United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co.10
The latter case prevents the more interesting application of the
use of a view in a relevant product market determination. In
duPont, one of the key problems for the court was determining
which, if any, flexible wrapping materials should be included
with cellophane in the relevant product market. DuPont's posi-
tion from the beginning was that its product was under intensive
competition from other flexible packaging materials and that,
because cellophane was not unique for the purposes sold, the
Authoritative standard publications, such as government market reports, estab-
lished statistical manuals and the like, may often be judicially noticed. When-
ever such publications are to be judicially noticed, advance notice should always
be given the parties and the fact of the notification should appear in the record.
Id. (footnotes omitted). FED. R. Evm. 201 contains provisions for the judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.
68. For an interesting perspective on views, see McGlothlin, Some Practical Problems
in Proof of Economic, Scientific and Technical Facts, Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23
F.R.D. 467, 474 n.9 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McGlothlin] in which the author com-
pares the use of a view to a motion picture. He states:
A motion picture film is much less desireable [sic] than the direct observations
of a personal view. A film is necessarily influenced by the judgment and tech-
nique of the photographer. A camera is a selective and interpretive tool in the
hands of its user, whereas the eye of an actual observer is objective. Also, the
court has less opportunity to obtain fuller explanation of particular points if
desired.
Id.
69. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). In this case
Judge Wyzanski visited factories in the industry.
70. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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company actually had been forced to alter its price due to this
competition.' It was, therefore, seeking to show that it did not
have monopoly power, i.e., the power to control the price or to
exclude competition. The proof of actual competitive pressure on
its product by other products therefore, was essential to duPont's
case.
A very effective demonstration of competition came when, dur-
ing the course of the trial, the judge saw a reference in a newspa-
per to a packaging show. After the trial, counsel for duPont ex-
plained events as follows:
He indicated from the Bench that he wished to go to the Show
to see whether or not it would throw light on the issues being
litigated. None of us on either side knew what the exhibits might
reveal. Thus it happened that without any advance warning,
counsel for both sides accompanied the court while for an entire
day he inspected exhibits presenting all phases of the flexible
packaging business. To the rising enthusiasm of duPont counsel
as the party walked from exhibit to exhibit, the judge encoun-
tered the most practical and concrete evidence possible of the
interproduct competition which the witnesses had been talking
about at the trial. After that visit it was obviously difficult for
the Government to carry the day with its theoretical arguments
that the materials did not compete because they had a different
chemical composition, or a different specific gravity, or a differ-
ent feel or appearance. The court had seen price and product
competition at firsthand."
By visiting the packaging show, the judge was able to observe how
cellophane was being displayed along with other flexible packag-
ing materials in the context of the needs and uses of the packag-
ing industry."
71. Gesell, Legal Problems Involved in Proving Relevant Markets, 2 ANTITRUST BULL.
463, 464 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Gesell].
72. Id. at 467. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41,
192 (D. Del. 1953), afl'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
73. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) in which the
district judge conducted a view of an investment banker's office with counsel. The judge,
after gaining familiarity with the operations, felt that he was better equipped to under-




The basic goal in any relevant product market analysis is to
delimit the competitive environment for a product or service by
painting a meaningful economic picture." Technical economic
evidence is certainly relevant, but successful counsel also may be
able to use simple techniques to demonstrate competition.
DuPont5 again serves as an excellent example of how physical
evidence was used to demonstrate for the court the nature of
competition faced by cellophane in the market. A sales represent-
ative of a glassine company brought into court packages of food
items that he had purchased in a supermarket. Some of the items
were wrapped in cellophane and some were wrapped in one or
more of the wrappings which duPont claimed competed with cel-
lophane." This graphic in-court display of competition caused
defense counsel to evaluate that day as "one of the most effective
days for the defense."" Thus, in spite of the complex nature of
the case, a very simple but effective method of proof was used by
the counsel to show the realities of the market place. Such proof
is by no means unique to this particular case. Physical evidence
always can be used to demonstrate the functional and physical
nature of products. What is outstanding about the use of the
evidence in this case is how it was used to give the court an insight
into the way competition functioned with respect to the various
products in questions.
B. Written Techniques
1. Intracompany Communications, Documents and Internal
Studies"6
Frequently, the courts will look to the defendant itself to see
74. For an interesting perspective on the viewpoint of counsel representing defendants,
see Mitchell, Preparing and Trying an Antitrust Claim: The Defendant's Case, 18 ABA
ANTITRUST SEcTION 50, 54 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell]. The author, in stressing
that counsel has to define competition and search out its realities, states that the defense
counsel's job is to "develop a theory to fit the facts rather than to try to fit the facts into
a preconceived theory."
75. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
76. Gesell, supra note 71, at 468.
77. Id.
78. Admissibility of these items can fall under exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e.g.,
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how the corporation has viewed its competition. Although it may
not be proper to determine a market based solely on how the
defendant views it," the defendant's perception of the market can
have considerable probative value. Accordingly, the courts fre-
quently have stressed intracompany documents which reflect the
defendant's views of the market as well as internal studies pre-
pared by or for the defendant corporation regarding the corpora-
tion's product and its competitive environment. 0 The use of in-
ternal documents for this purpose is by no means restricted to a
defendant corporation. Similar documents from a plaintiff may
very well be relevant to the issue.
DuPont"' serves as an excellent example of how internal docu-
ments and studies were used to show that duPont considered
other flexible packaging materials relevant with respect to com-
petition and pricing. The defendant's documents were used to
support the position that cellophane did in fact compete with
other flexible packaging materials. The court considered, for ex-
ample, market studies undertaken by duPont to determine pack-
aging habits of retail customers of a variety of packaging products
and the effect on sales of packaging a given product in cello-
phane.2
The court discussed packaging in the candy industry to show
the competitive factors. One document the court referred to was
a 1937 duPont sales bulletin." The sales bulletin alluded to the
price and stated that duPont's loss of sales on wrapping materials
for 5¢ and 10¢ candy bars was due partly to "intensive selling
efforts on the part of foil and glassine manufacturers."84 Evidenc-
ing the competitive environment, the report went on to state:
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), 803(6), 803(16).
79. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Mass. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
80. In this area, see S. LEWIS, MERGERS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS, ANTITRUST
WORKSHOP-1970, 17 (Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Hand-
book No. 31) in which the author provides a checklist of factual research to be accom-
plished with respect to the line of commerce in a merger case in addition to the type of
internal documents which are useful in showing the firm's view of the relevant product
market.
81. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
82. Id. at 87.
83. Id. at 201-02.
84. Id. at 202.
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This seems to be a situation where, in our effort to stimulate
individual candy wraps, we have slackened off on our attack on
bars, setting the stage for inroads by selling campaigns of other
types of wraps. We now have the job of stopping these inroads
and striking back in a positive manner."
Thus, by using company documents and studies, duPont was able
to show that it had been faced with a market wherein it had to
consider key factors such as pricing and competitive maneuvers
by manufacturers of products similar to its own.
Although in duPont, company documents were used to support
the defendant's position, internal documents may also work to
the defendant's detriment.8" In Abex Corporation v. FTC87 the
court considered whether sintered metal friction materials for
clutches, brakes, and transmissions for heavy duty equipment
and machinery should be considered a separate submarket or
whether, as the defendant claimed, the market should be made
up of a wider competitive field which included "both 'organic'
friction materials (asbestos brakes, etc.) and metal friction mate-
rials. 88 The defendant contended that any clutch or braking de-
vice designed for the use of sintered metal friction could be de-
signed for the use of other material such as organic or other metal
friction material.
The court, in upholding the Federal Trade Commission's prod-
uct market determination that sintered metal friction materials
were in a relevant product submarket, referred to annual reports
of the defendant for the years 1958, 1960, and 1961 .8 These
annual reports contained explanations regarding the unique
physical qualities of sintered metal friction parts and compari-
sons between the functions of sintered metal friction materials
and other friction materials. The former were shown to be unique
85. Id.
86. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967) (cited analyses
and studies made by General Foods' management); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395
F. Supp. 538, 544 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (cited documents prepared by the defendants which
reflected industry recognition that the product market was more narrow than the defen-
dants were contending).
87. 420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
88. Id. at 930.
89. Id. at 930-31.
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for some uses requiring extreme durability and strength.9" The
court cited the above reports as clearly showing the indicia of
"peculiar characteristics and uses. '"1
Internal documents also may be used against a plaintiff in a
private suit. In Telex's suit against IBM"2 the district court held
that the relevant product market was limited to peripheral de-
vices which were plug-compatible with IBM central processing
units plus some particular product submarkets. On appeal, IBM
contended that, at the least, the market should consist of all
peripheral products and not be limited to only those plug-
compatible with IBM units . 3 An issue for the court centered
around the ease of designing interfaces, attachments which allow
peripheral products to be used with central processing units of
other systems.
The court of appeals held that the relevant product market
should include not only peripheral products plug-compatible with
IBM central processing units but also those compatible with non-
IBM units. 4 One basis for this holding was the court's determina-
tion that even those peripherals originally non-compatible with
IBM units could be made so at a reasonable cost and were, there-
fore, reasonably interchangeable products. In support of its posi-
tion, the circuit court cited a February 4, 1972 memorandum of
Telex's Chairman of the Board showing the practicability of in-
terface change on peripheral equipment. 5 The presence of this
document prepared by an executive of the plaintiff helped the
court to make a ruling contrary to the interests of the plaintiff.
Such internal documents and studies, therefore, can play a major
role in the analysis of the competitive environments of products.
90. Id. The reports cited physical properties which made the material unique for use
in the brakes of jet aircraft and in the transmissions of heavy duty earthmoving equip-
ment. Uses which required extreme heat and wear resistance were prime areas in which
sintered metal friction materials were unique.
91. Id. at 932. But cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
92. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and rem'd in part with directions, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
93. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 914 (1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
94. Id. at 919.
95. Id. at 917.
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2. Census Data and Industry Statistics
Government and private sources of industrial statistics and
data96 can be used as a source of information for a product market
determination. They are valuable for the precise information that
they provide, such as data regarding prices from the Consumer
Price Index 7 and shares of certain product lines from the U.S.
Bureau of Census figures. In addition to government sources,
data published regularly in business publications" may be help-
ful. This category would include "market quotations, tabula-
tions, lists, directories"'' 00 and other published compilations
which generally are relied upon by the public or by persons in
particular occupations. Examples of these are financial and busi-
ness data from newspapers 0 ' and data from Moody's Industri-
als. 11 Aside from the pure factual information that the above
sources can provide, their use in relevant product market deter-
minations may be more novel. Because relevant product markets
are to correspond with commercial realities, the manner in which
the accepted and relied upon industrial statistical sources classify
a product or industry may be relevant.
In Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,'3 the Federal Trade Com-
mission contended that the relevant market was "census coarse
paper."'' This designation came from a Bureau of Census
classification that designated a major category to be trade coarse
paper'05 and listed thereunder various subclassifications. One of
these was census coarse paper. Crown Zellerbach argued that
such a determination was incorrect and that all trade coarse pap-
96. For a discussion regarding aspects of admissibility of official records and reports,
see Dession, supra note 67, at 1253-55; FED. R. EvID. 803(8), 803(17) (covering exceptions
to the hearsay rule).
97. See generally Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258,
293 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967) (Consumer Price Index was
admitted on the issue of damages).
98. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 916 n.17 (10th Cir. 1975).
99. Regarding admissibility, see FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
100. Id.
101. See 16N VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 67, at §§110.01(1), 110.02, 110-37 n.9.
102. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 70 n.222, 71 n.229
(D. Del. 1953).
103. 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
104. Id. at 806.
105. Id. at 805.
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ers as listed in the Census classification constituted the product
dimension of the relevant market.' Crown maintained that the
designations of the papers were "grouped together by the Census
merely for statistical reasons and that the census grouping means
nothing ... ."107 The court disagreed and, although not allowing
the Census grouping to determine the relevant market, it clearly
recognized the probative value of a Census grouping.'"'
A similar use of Census data was made in United States v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp.' in which the court noted that although
Census classifications do not "ipso facto establish relevant mar-
kets, they may be used to measure a relevant market which has
been established by evidence showing industry usage and trade
practice.""' The court supported this use of Census data by the
testimony of the Chief, Wholesale Trade Division, Bureau of Cen-
sus, establishing the
lengthy and careful study of trade practices and industry usage
which is made by Census to insure that its classifications, in
fact, correspond to commercial realities."'
Census classifications, therefore, may be one form of recognition
which the courts consider to be a valid relevant product market
indicator."'
3. Trade Association Data and Trade Literature"'
Trade association data and trade literature also can have pro-
106. Id. at 806.
107. Id. at 807.
108. [We must recognize that it is possible that this grouping has behind
it some facts or circumstances relating to the paper industry which may have
led to the grouping originally although it is not specifically named or designated
in the Census report. ...
• . . The Census classification cannot be meaningless-there must be factual
differences on which that classification is made . ...
Id. at 807, 813.
109. 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
110. Id. at 453 n.17.
111. Id.
112. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976) (court considered
Census groupings); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(court cited Census classifications).
113. Regarding admissibility, see FED. R. EvID. 803(17).
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bative value in demonstrating industry recognition or competi-
tive pressures. The trade association data need not necessarily
come from the defendant's industry."4 For example, in United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. ," duPont used publica-
tions from the packaging trade. These publications contained
discussions of packaging developments with technical comments
regarding the ability of various materials to serve packaging
needs."'8 With these publications, duPont was able to demon-
strate the industry's recognition of the competitive qualities of
duPont's product and other flexible packaging materials for par-
ticular end uses. Thus, duPont was able to show competitive
pressures on its product.
In addition to the specific evidence of market recognition in
trade association market reports, the courts are able to draw other
conclusions from trade association information. In United States
v. M.P.M., Inc., "' the court held that ready-mix concrete was a
separate product market from other building materials. One basis
for so holding was a finding that the building industry recognized
that ready-mix concrete producers were a separate economic en-
tity within the construction trade."' The court found that trade
associations consisting only of ready-mix concrete companies
have been formed to promote use of their product."' Thus, indus-
try recognition can be shown not only by specific recognition of
certain factors by the industry, but also by how the industry
reacts and groups itself within the competitive environments.
4. Advertising Claims
In an appropriate situation, the courts may examine the adver-
tising claims of the defendant for their relevance to product mar-
ket determinations. In United States v. Blue Bell, Inc. 120 the court
specifically referred to the advertising documents of the defen-
dants as indicating that the manufacture and sale of industrial
114. See Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 749 (D. Del. 1973) (court cited
association recognition).
115. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
116. Gesell, supra note 71, at 468.
117. 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975).
118. Id. at 87.
119. Id.
120. 395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
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rental garments was recognized by the industry as a distinct line
of business." '
In addition to the relevant information contained in a defen-
dant's advertising, the claims made by other firms may show the
extent of competition faced by the defendant's product. Effective
use of such advertising material was made by the defense in
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. 2' DuPont intro-
duced advertising claims by other flexible packaging manufactur-
ers which were in journals of various trades.'23 The district court
recognized this as evidence that other manufacturers were hold-
ing their products out as equally able to satisfy the packaging
requirements of various principal trade customers.' The Su-
preme Court viewed this evidence as "examples of the competi-
tion among manufacturers for the flexible packaging market.' 12 5
Competitors' advertising claims may be viewed by the courts
as mere puffing and not truly representative of the actual compe-
tition. Such a finding was made by the court in General Foods
Corporation v. FTC.128 General Foods had argued unsuccessfully
that non-steel wool products competed with household steel wool
products. It was General Foods' position that non-steel wool prod-
ucts whose composition ranged from "plastic, to copper, to
abrasive-surface sponges"'2 7 were functionally similar to the steel
wool soap pad. In so doing, it cited various advertisements by the
manufacturers of the other products. The court discounted this
evidence stating that "[a]dvertising puffs' 12 would not be con-
sidered as evidence of something which could not be proved at
trial. Thus, advertising claims, although possessing probative
value, probably will not stand alone but will be considered in
light of the totality of the evidence before the court.
121. Id. at 544.
122. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
123. Id. at 62-63. See also Gesell, supra note 71, at 467-68.
124. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
125. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 402 (1956).
126. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).




5. Summaries, Tabulations, Graphs and Charts
Summaries, tabulations, graphs and charts are methods of
presenting facts. Their use cuts across the boundaries of various
types of factual matter and their prime importance lies in their
ability to make what otherwise might be a totally unmanageable
case at least somewhat workable. When discussing the types of
evidence which are used and desired by courts in making difficult
economic determinations, such as relevant market, these forms
are of prime importance. Because antitrust cases frequently in-
volve the examination of an industry's activities over an extensive
period of time, it is impractical to present to the court invoice
after invoice to prove the long-term pricing of products. Likewise,
it would be impractical to present to a court piecemeal evidence
regarding many other aspects of an industry. The reasonable way
to do this is through a compilation of the available data in the
forms of tabulations, graphs, charts and summaries.
The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically provide for admis-
sion of evidence such as summaries and charts,'29 and the Manual
for Complex Litigation' provides support and guidance for their
use.' 3' When these methods are used, they can facilitate a court's
understanding and appreciation of cross-elasticity of demand by
showing relative price movements and market shares. In addi-
tion, other relevant product market indicators, such as compara-
tive physical properties, can be presented successfully to courts
in this form. 32
129. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
130. BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
131. Id. §§2.711, at 72, 2.717, at 87. For consideration of the unique problems with these
forms of evidence, see Dession, supra note 67, at 1258-59; 16N VON KALINOWSKI, supra note
67, at §§110.01(2), 110-10 to 110-11, 110.02, 110-58 to 110-61. McGlothlin, supra note 68,
at 469-74; Lasky, Proof of Complicated Economic and Technical Facts and Handling of
Documents, Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 606, 609-11 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Lasky]; MASSEL, supra note 10, at 285-87; ABA REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL OF ANTITRUST CASES OF THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAw 40-43 (1954); MANUAL, supra note 130, §3.50, at 102-03.
132. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 63, 82-86,
112-13 (D. Del. 1953).
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6. Surveys, Samples and Polls
Another method which facilitiates the gathering and presenta-
tion of vast data to the courts is the use of surveys, samples and
polls. These are methods which generally enable the user to draw
facts and conclusions from sources without actually having to
examine the sources directly in court. For example, it would be
impossible to call all consumers before the court in order to deter-
mine their attitude toward a particular product, their product
loyalty, their propensity to change products in accordance with
price changes or their conception of competing products. Also,
there is a question of how representative the testimony of only a
few consumers would be when those consumers are not necessar-
ily selected by a scientific method. They may in fact not be repre-
sentative of the consumers in the market in question. One way
to solve this dilemma is to utilize scientifically conducted sam-
pling and polling procedures to gather the evidence.'33
The Manual refers to sampling as involving physical examina-
tions of the parts of the whole to determine the objectively observ-
able facts.'3 ' It contrasts polls as dealing with the questioning of
a part of the population to determine what the interviewees "have
seen, think, do or believe, or. . .why they think, act or believe
in a certain way."''3 The primary difficulty with the use of these
methods in litigation centers around problems of admissibility.
Sampling generally involves problems of relevancy, as to whether
or not the sample accurately reflects the whole.'36 Polls, on the
other hand, usually involve joint problems of relevancy and com-
petency, the primary problem being one of hearsay.'37 Both the
133. See MANUAL, supra note 130, §2.712, at 73. For an interesting practical analogy to
everyday situations involving sampling and an extensive discussion concerning sampling,
its values, procedures, evidentiary aspects, etc., see MASSEL, supra note 10, at 287-316.
134. MANUAL, supra note 130, §2.712 at 73.
135. Id. at 73-74.
136. Lasky, supra note 131, at 611-12. See also MANUAL, supra note 130, §2.712, at 74-
75.
137. Lasky, supra note 131, at 612. For a further treatment of this problem area,
including the manner in which courts have addressed this hearsay objection, see MANUAL,




Manual' and the Federal Rules of Evidence"9 reflect an accept-
ance of these methods. In both areas, the methodology employed
in structuring and conducting the surveys, samples, and polls are
key factors in their admissibility."'
Sampling procedures can be used to gather quantitative data
which bear on the dimensions of a product market. Data such as
the prices of the defendant's product as compared to the prices
of other products' and information concerning the respective
quantities purchased at varying prices is obtainable and will give
an indication of the cross-elasticity of demand. In addition, sales
data showing how many dealers handle the defendant's product
as compared to the possible substitutes will give a good indication
of the degree of competition that is taking place at various sales
levels. "I
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., "I Judge
Wyzanski, urging the use of sampling procedures in antitrust
138. MANUAL, supra note 130, §2.712, at 76. Consider also the accompanying discussions
within that reference of the determination of the factors of necessity and trustworthiness,
and the burden of proof with respect to the methodology of the research conducted. Id. at
76-77.
139. FED. R. EvIa. 703, 803(24).
140. See H. BARKSDALE, THE USE OF SURVEY RESEARCH FINDINGS As LEGAL EVIDENCE
(1957) for an extensive examination of the use of such evidence; Barnes, Quantitative Data
and Sample Surveys as Evidence in Judicial or Administrative Procedures, 19 CURRENT
Bus. STUD. 33 (1954); Dean, Sampling to Produce Evidence on Which Courts Will Rely,
19 CURRENT Bus. STUD. 5 (1954); Deming, On the Contributions of Standards of Sam-
pling to Legal Evidence and Accounting, 19 CURRENT Bus. STUD. 14 (1954); Early, The
Use of Survey Evidence in Antitrust Proceedings, 33 WASH. L. REv. & ST. B.J. 380 (1958);
Kocker, Admissibility in Courts of Law of Economic Data Based on Samples, 28 J. Bus.
114 (1955); Soronsen & Soronsen, Responding to Objections Against the Use of Opinion
Survey Findings in the Courts, 20 J. MKT'G 133 (1955); Zeisol, The Uniqueness of Survey
Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322 (1960). For discussion of the use of surveys and statistics,
see Deming, On the Presentation of the Results of Sample Surveys as Legal Evidence, 29
J. AM. STAT. 814 (1954). See also United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903
(W.D. Mo. 1975), in which the plaintiff tried to use a survey to prove the relevant market.
The case is an excellent example of how courts are willing to use surveys which are
properly conducted. In this case the plaintiff, however, did not follow the judge's pretrial
order with reference to the taking of the survey.
141. See State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471 (N.D.
Il1. 1957), rev'd in part, 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1958)
which, although not a monopolization or merger case, contains good examples of a con-
sumer shopping survey and a price survey which were admitted into evidence in a price
discrimination case.
142. For an explanation of duPont's use of this approach at the trial level in United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), see Gesell, supra
note 71, at 471.
143. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
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cases,' 44 admitted depositions from a sample of 45 shoe manufac-
turers operating 55 factories.4 The information from these sam-
ple depositions was summarized for the court enabling the judge
to get a feeling for the nature of the competition and the relation
between the defendant's machines and the competitors' ma-
chines in American shoe factories at the time of the taking of the
sample.'46
Surveying, sampling, and polling techniques can be used to
gather evidence prior to and during trial,'47 but the courts also
may look to surveys prepared by a party, its agent, by trade
associations or other organizations for other business purposes
and not with a view toward any litigation. These surveys may be
relevant to industry recognition or actual competiton faced by a
product.'48 Observations about the market by organizations which
144. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). "If
antitrust trials are to be kept manageable, samples must be used, and a sample which is
in general reasonable should not be rejected in the absence of the offer of a better sample."
Id. at 305-06.
145. The nature of the sample, which was taken at the court's suggestion, was as
follows:
The court arbitrarily selected from a standard directory of shoe manufacturers,
the first 15 names that began with the first letter of the alphabet, the first 15
names that began with the eleventh letter of the alphabet, all eight of the names
that began with the twenty-first letter of the alphabet, and the first seven names
that began with the twenty-second letter of the alphabet. This sample
cover[ed] 3 per cent of the shoe manufacturers. The sample include[d] small
and large factories, and concerns manufacturing shoes according to substan-
tially the most popular shoe manufacturing process.
Id. at 305.
146. Id. at 306. See also C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORA-
TION, AN ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF AN ANTITRUST CASE 45-55 (1956). This book is an entire
explanation of the case from the perspective of Dr. Carl Kaysen who was the economist
who served as the law clerk to Judge Wyzanski.
147. See United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)
(government-run surveys were used); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.
1973) (court admitted depositions secured through survey methods); United States v.
National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961) (survey was used to gather sales
data to show the dimensions of the line of commerce). The last case is a good example of
the types of objections raised to the admission of surveys, how they are distinguished from
sampling problems and how the hearsay issue can be treated with respect to such prob-
lems. The case also gives examples of good and bad survey questions respecting methodol-
ogy used in the survey.
148. See Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 749 (D. Del. 1973) where the
manner in which an independent accounting firm's survey analyzed the market was con-
sidered meaningful and held to be evidence of a recognition of the market.
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conduct surveys independent of litigation also may have proba-
tive value. The survey organization's market view was considered
in Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co. 49 The court
considered the recommendations of the defendant concerning
the complimentary nature of products. The recommendation was
contained in a marketing survey which had earlier been prepared
for Chevron.
Aside from the data that surveys provide, the courts may con-
sider the way that surveys are structured as an indication of
industry recognition and a reflection of the competitive situation.
In A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC5 ' the court relied heavily
on surveys conducted by the Athletic Goods Manufacturing
Association (A.G.M.A.). At issue was whether the lines of com-
merce, in the merger case, should be comprised of individual lines
of athletic products, such as baseballs and softballs as Spalding
contended,' 5 or be broken down further into high-priced lines and
low-priced lines of each product line as the Federal Trade Com-
mission concluded.' 52
The court referred to earlier surveys taken by the A.G.M.A.
which were conducted for the purpose of gathering statistics re-
garding the athletic goods industry's production. These surveys
specifically requested the manufacturers to provide production
figures broken down into specific price categories. This fact, plus
the testimony of members of the A.G.M.A. who gave reasons why
the survey was structured by price categories, was considered to
be meaningful. It became part of the substantial evidence in the
record which supported the Federal Trade Commission's finding
that the line of commerce should be made up of the high-priced
and low-priced items within each product line.'53
C. Oral Techniques
1. Trade Witnesses
Testimony may be presented by an expert witness with special
149. 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
150. 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
151. Id. at 597.
152. Id. at 595.
153. Id. at 598.
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expertise in an area such as economics or accounting. However,
there is another category of witnesses who prove valuable in anti-
trust litigation. These are the industry witnesses such as experi-
enced businessmen who have worked in the industry for an exten-
sive period of time, executives within the companies in question,
other businessmen in trades concerned, and salesmen who func-
tion at the competitive level. Such witnesses may be uniquely
qualified to inform the court of the background of the industry,
competitive conditions within it, and the reasons for certain busi-
ness actions. They may be able to give the court a very real
impression of the nature of competitive pressures.'"
The experienced businessman's testimony may be more mean-
ingful to a court than the economist's testimony. 5 ' It has been
observed by a Department of Justice Antitrust Division attorney
that such testimony usually is better received and that courts
may have a tendency to rely more heavily on it even in areas
where specialized academic study is relevant. 5'
Because one indicator of the relevant product market is how
the defendant or parties to the litigation view the market, the
testimony of executives of the company or companies involved
can be very important.'57 How the executives view the market and
whether they consider certain products as direct competitors can
be the type of information supplied by people experienced with
day-to-day decision-making responsibilities within the competi-
tive environment.' Executive testimony, illuminating in the
154. For the perspective of a defense attorney on the use of live witnesses, see Mitchell,
supra note 74, at 58.
155. Reycraft, Use of Expert Economic Assistance in the Prosecution of Antitrust
Cases, 20 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 80, 86-87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Reycraft]. For a
discussion of the value of this type of witness, see O'Donnell, Civil Antitrust Trials, 4 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 73, 87 (1954).
156. Reycraft, supra note 155. See also Gesell, supra note 71, at 473-74 for similar
observations regarding such witnesses in the case of United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
157. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967); Hughes Tool
Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525, 534-38 (E.D. Okla. 1953), modified, 215 F.2d 924 (1954).
158. See Science Prod. Co. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
in which the president of the plaintiff corporation gave his opinion regarding whether
certain products constituted a single product line. The witness' answer, however, was
contrary to the in-court position being taken by the plaintiff and was cited by the court
as one basis for accepting the defendant's definition of the relevant product market.
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area of pricing decision, also can cast some light on the competi-
tive situation and even cross-elasticity of demand. DuPont suc-
cessfully used such testimony to demonstrate for the court that
in its pricing decisions it considered the prices of other products.
By this testimony, duPont showed the court that it was faced
with an environment in which there were competitive pressures
on its cellophane. 5 '
The court in Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co. 60
found cross-elasticity of demand demonstrated in the testimony
of the national market manager of a division of the defendant
corporation. In examining the relationship of dry fertilizer to liq-
uid fertilizer, the manager testified that in pricing liquid ferti-
lizer, Chevron considered the price of dry fertilizer and that in
pricing dry fertilizer they considered the price of liquid. The court
concluded that the unchallenged testimony of the national mar-
ket manager clearly demonstrated the cross-elasticity of demand
between liquid and dry fertilizers.'' Because of the court's ability
to make findings regarding cross-elasticity of demand from pric-
ing decision testimony, 6 ' such testimony can be crucially impor-
tant in a relevant product market determination.
Not only will testimony of executives of the litigants be impor-
tant, but testimony of other executives within the industry and
businessmen who use the products also may be used to show that
products are considered to be competitive 3 and to show industry
recognition of distinct lines of business. 6 ' The testimony of other
businessmen within an industry concerning their pricing deci-
sions also has been considered on the question of price sensitiv-
ity.165
159. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 82-86 (D. Del.
1953).
160. 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
161. Id. at 798.
162. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1967) in which, in the
absence of evidence of consumer sensitivity to prices, the court upheld the FTC's finding
of a lack of sensitivity of prices based partly on the testimony of corporate executives that
they had not considered prices of non-steel wool products in pricing their steel wool
products.
163. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 204-06 (D. Del.
1953).
164. See United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 544 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
165. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1967) (court cited
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Where questions of unique qualities, special consumer demand,
or the variety or uniqueness of end uses are litigated, the testi-
mony of businessmen whose companies use the products in ques-
tion may be given considerable weight by the courts. These wit-
nesses are the ones who have first hand knowledge of why they
can substitute products or, on the contrary, why they can only use
a certain product and what qualities make a particular product
unique for their purposes. 6' The value of this type of testimony
was demonstrated in United States v. International Boxing Club
of New York,' 7 in which the court held that the promotion of
championship boxing contests was the relevant product market.
In affirming that decision, the Supreme Court specifically cited
the testimony of representatives of the broadcasting, motion pic-
ture and advertising industries. Although the media representa-
tives were not the ultimate consumers of the product, they were
intermediate consumers whose testimony as to special demands
by them was very relevant to the issue of the uniqueness of the
product.
Finally, examining the competitive environment of a product,
a very persuasive source of evidence will be the salesmen of that
product who have a unique ability to portray for the court the
competition encountered day-to-day.'
2. Expert Witnesses
Most authorities recommend that an economist be brought into
the case as early as possible so that he can assist with questions
and concepts. He also can assist in the formulation of the eco-
nomic theory of the case.' The economic expert, for example,
testimony of other steel wool manufacturers to the effect that in pricing their products
they disregarded the prices of non-steel wool products and looked only to S.O.S. and
Brillo, the largest household steel wool products producers).
166. See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo). 1975) (building
contractors testified regarding the qualities and uses of ready-mix concrete); Hughes Tool
Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525, 534-35 (E.D. Okla. 1953) (drilling contractors testified
regarding the uniqueness of roller rock bits in drilling operations).
167. 150 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
168. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 198, 202 (D.
Del. 1953) (court specifically cited the use of testimony and reports from salesmen).
169. Id. at 42. See also Dean, Functioning of the Economist in Antitrust Litigation, 20
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 71 (1962) for a good summary of the various ways that economic
[Vol. 26:530
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will not only be of assistance during the trial to testify regarding
his opinions on the data and evidence that have come before the
court, he is valuable in the beginning of the litigation to assist in
the gathering of the evidence and in keeping the volume of evi-
dence within manageable limits.7 " Accountants and experts in
the areas of sampling and polling procedures also may be very
helpful. As previously indicated, the use of polls and samples for
determining relevant product market is becoming more impor-
tant due to their increasing use by litigants and recognition by
courts."'
Use of an economist requires consideration of many factors.72
For example, in the area of relevant product market the econo-
mists will make differing judgments regarding such issues as the
cut-off point at which they are willing to say there is meaningful
cross-elasticity of demand and the relevance of supply substituta-
bility.'73 At trial, the economic expert is valuable for the opinions
he can render based on the data before him, the evidence which
has come out at the trial or even his study of the industry.' Not
only is the expert valuable to the litigants, but also to the trial
judge who has various options available with respect to expert
experts can be used in antitrust situations. For prosecution and defense perspectives on
the use of economic assistance, see Reycraft, supra note 155, and Groenke, Use of Eco-
nomic Assistance in Defense of Antitrust Cases, 20 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION (1962), respec-
tively.
170. See Edwards, supra note 53, at 41.
171. For an example of the consideratons in cross-examining such experts, see Kiernan,
Observations on the Problem of Cross-Examining in Antitrust Cases, 18 ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION 71, 71-74 (1961); Deming, supra note 140 (statistician's point of view).
172. See Bock, Choosing an Expert is a Delicate Thing, 11 CONF. BOARD REC. 8 (1974)
for perspective on considerations involved in choosing and understanding the economic
expert. One of the consistently recognized factors is that economists will frequently be
divided into two schools: the one believing in the structural test and the other believing
in the behaviorist test. Id. See also McGlothlin, supra note 68, at 478. The former will
look to the number and size of the units in an industry while the latter is primarily
concerned with what actually happens within the industry. Bock, supro. This dilemma,
however, will more likely come into focus on issues of monopoly power or in an analysis
of the acts of the defendant rather than in a relevant product market determination.
173. For references regarding supply substitutability, see note 53 supra.
174. For an example of such testimony and the ways the issues can be treated, see
Scanlon, supra note 11, at 55-112. Both examples come from testimony before the Federal
Trade Commission but serve to highlight the type of testimony of economic experts.
Conclusions regarding relevant product market and cross-elasticity are not substantially
influenced by whether an economist is in the so-called structural or behavioral schools.
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assistance. The judge can utilize neutral experts in capacities
such as masters, court appointed experts, or even advisors to the
court.'75 In such capacities, the experts can provide assistance to
the courts in the resolution of the complex economic issues.
The ultimate persuasive power of expert witnesses, however,
may not be as great as one might assume. The court in
SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co. 7 ' was faced with an im-
pressive array of expert witnesses presented by Eli Lilly and Com-
pany to show that the relevant market should be all anti-infective
drugs as opposed to the plaintiff's contention that it should only
be the cephalosporin family of antibiotic drugs.'77 The trial
court's perspective on the evidence can be obtained from the
following statement by the court:
The credentials of these scholars are impeccable, but they are
not typical representatives of the persons ordering or prescribing
drugs for the nonprofit hospital industry. While we all admired
the extraordinary speed of the gold medalist who won the 400
meter relay for the United States in Montreal in July, it would
be foolish to assume that his speed, finesse, skills and physical
condition constitutes the norm of agility and talent of the aver-
175. The use of experts in these capacities as aids to the courts is sanctioned in the
MANUAL, supra note 130, §2.60, at 65-70. FEn. R. EVID. 706 provides for court appointed
experts.
The appointment of an expert as an advisor to the court was used by Judge Wyzanski.
He appointed Dr. Carl Kaysen, who was then an economist at Harvard, as his "law clerk"
in the case of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953). Dr. Kaysen advised the court through frequent conversations with the judge as the
trial progressed and by a memorandum at the conclusion of the trial. All contacts between
the judge and Dr. Kaysen, including the memorandum, were private and counsel were not
privy to them. See KAYsEN, supra note 146, for a complete description of the case. The
book contains a description of his work as the law clerk as well as a thorough description
of the evidence.
Criticisms and questions of fairness have been raised surrounding the procedure used
by Judge Wyzanski. For a discussion of the problem with respect to its effect on the
adversary system, see Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's Law Clerk in Sherman Act
Cases, 12 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 43, 45-59 (1958). For a criticism of the procedure and
an observation that it would reduce the standing of the judicial system and even encourage
trials of "unmanageable proportions," see Massel, Economic Analysis in Judicial Anti-
trust Decisions, 20 ABA ANTITRUsT SECTION 46, 57 (1962). For expressions of general
reservations regarding the feasibility of the use of "neutral" experts on economic issues,
see McGlothlin, supra note 68, at 479-80; Lasky, supra note 131, at 611.




age American his age. The blunt truth is that most physicians
and hospital administrators, in their daily practice, are no closer
to the cost-benefit analysis advocated by Harvard Medical
School Professor Dr. Kass, than are little leaguers equal to the
performance of the National League All-Star baseball team."8
The court's focus was clearly on the realities of the market wher-
ever it found evidence accurately to portray those realities.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
In examining the indicators of relevant product market, both
the courts and counsel have been versatile in fulfilling their re-
spective roles. The issues in these inquiries are economically com-
plex. Counsel and the courts have been creative in the search for
evidence which will help identify the competitive environment of
a product.
Each type of evidence examined has the capacity for more
creative use. If any one category of evidence, however, holds
greater promise for more extensive and creative use, it is the area
of surveys, samples and polls. The use of these forms offers an
excellent opportunity for the courts to reduce litigation time
while assessing credible information. The primary goal of rele-
vant product market analysis is to determine consumer reaction,
buying patterns and the bases for their decisions and actions.
Surveys, samples and polls offer an ideal way to reach more con-
sumers and thereby obtain a broader base of information upon
which to make any decision. As a resource they are just beginning
to be tapped by the courts. Their further utilization is a goal
worth pursuing by both the judiciary and counsel.
178. Id.
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